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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GARY J. WITHERSPOON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 14285

vs.
WALTER T. STEWART, et al.,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Respondent GARY J. WITHERSPOON sued
defendants and prayed for judgment declaring the $1,500.00
paid by JERRY YECK forfeited as liquidated damages as
provided in the contract of sale, and for a Writ of
Replevin requiring the return of certain cattle and that
he, GARY J. WITHERSPOON, be declared sole owner of said
property.
Defendant-Appellant, WALTER STEWART, answered
praying that the Court find him sole owner of the cattle.
FIRST SECURITY BANK intervened and asserted a
security interest in the cattle.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
Intervenor, FIRST SECURITY BANK, was granted a
summary judgment upon its secured interest and was awarded
- 1 -
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first priority on the proceeds of the sale of the cattle*
The case was tried upon the issue of whether
Defendant-Appellant, WALTER STEWART, was a bona fide
purchaser and entitled to recover against Plaintiff-Respondent, GARY WITHERSPOON.

The Court granted judgment for the

Plaintiff-Respondent and against the Defendant-Appellant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Respondent, GARY J, WITHERSPOON, seeks
affirmance of the trial court's judgment*
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or before the 18th day of February, 197 4,
JERRY YECK approached the plaintiff, GARY J. WITHERSPOON,
and asked to purchase his cattle, consisting of 19 steers
and 16 heifers.
$12,325.00*

He offered to pay to the plaintiff

The plaintiff and JERRY YECK entered into an

agreement whereby the plaintiff agreed to sell and JERRY
YECK agreed to buy the cattle for the sum of $12,325.00.
Said sum was paid over to the plaintiff by JERRY YECK in
the form of two checks drawn on Zions First National Bank,
one for the sum of $11,450.00 and a second check drawn in
the sum of $815.00.

At or about the same time as the

delivery of checks, the Plaintiff-Respondent delivered to
JERRY YECK a Bill of Sale consisting of four pages, dated
February 18, 1974, and a three-page supplement to the Bill
of Sale, all of which were admitted in evidence upon
- 2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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stipulation of counsel.
On the 20th day of February, 1974, the plaintiff
contacted Zions First National Bank to secure payment on
the two checks and was informed that the checks were not
good, that the account had been closed.

Thereafter, the

Plaintiff-Respondent contacted JERRY YECK and informed him
that the checks had not been paid upon presentation and
that JERRY YECK was not to remove the cattle from their
corral and that the plaintiff wanted a return of the Bill
of Sale.

The Plaintiff-Respondent secured a return of the

original Bill of Sale on the 20th day of February, 1974,
and has maintained the original in his possession since
that time.
At the time of the transaction and continuously
thereafter, GARY J. WITHERSPOON owned and possessed the
Utah State Department of Agriculture Certificate of
Registration on the cattle in question.

The original Cert-

ificate of Registration on the cattle in question. The
original Certificate of Registration was offered and
accepted as an exhibit without objection. At all times
during the transaction between the 18th day of February,
1974, and the 24th day of February, 1974, the cattle
remained in their respective corrals at Mills, Utah and
Fayette, Utah*
Upon determination that the checks had been dishonored at the bank, GARY J, WITHERSPOON notified the
- 3-
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defendant JERRY YECK, that the cattle were to remain in
their corrals; he further notified the Utah County Sheriff's
Department, the Utah State Highway Patrol, the Utah County
Attorney's Office, and the First Security Bank,

The

purpose of his calls was to retain possession of the cattle
and to alert all persons or organizations that may have an
interest that someone may attempt to remove the cattle and
they were not authorized to do so.
GARY J. WITHERSPOON had not authorized anyone to
either show his cattle or assist anyone in removing the
cattle from the corrals at Fayette or Mills.
On or about the 21st day of February, 1974, which
was a Thursday, VIRGIL REDMOND, JERRY YECK and others
journeyed to Fayette and Mills to look at the cattle, and
upon having done so contacted the Defendant-Appellant,
WALTER STEWART, by telephone and offered to sell the cattle
to him.

Thereafter WALTER STEWART examined the cattle in

Fayette and Mills and determined he wanted to make a purchase
and entered into an agreement with VIRGIL REDMOND who at
said time was acting as a sales representative for PHILLIP
GEORGE,

The parties came to an agreement whereby the cattle

were to be sold for the sum of $8,500.00.
At the time of the negotiations, VIRGIL REDMOND
represented to WALTER STEWART that he had a Bill of Sale
from GARY J. WITHERSPOON, and VIRGIL REDMOND displayed the
- 4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Bill of Sale from Deseret Distributing Company to American
Federal Corporation, and delivered a copy of a Bill of
Sale dated February 20, 1974, from American Federal
Corporation to WALTER STEWART. At no time did WALTER
STEWART see the original Bill of Sale from GARY J. WITHERSPOON
to JERRY YECK.

On the 21st day of February, 1974, WALTER

STEWART, in the company of VIRGIL REDMOND and other persons,
went to the bank and WALTER STEWART secured a cashier's
check in the sum of $8,500*00, cashed the check and
delivered the cash to VIRGIL REDMOND, who in turn delivered
the cash to PHILLIP GEORGE.
Thereafter on the 24th day of February, 1974,
WALTER STEWART began loading the cattle on his vehicle, at
which time a SETH McPHERSON, who was operating the ranch
upon which the cattle were located, notified GARY J.
WITHERSPOON of the attempted removal. Witherspoon informed
him that the removal was unauthorized, and notifed the
Utah County Sheriff's Department, Highway Patrol, Utah
County Attorney's Office and the First Security Bank. At
the request of GARY J. WITHERSPOON the cattle were
confiscated by the Utah County Sheriff's Office, impounded,
and ultimately disposed of to First Security Bank, who held
a security interest in said cattle.
At no time during the period February 18, 1974,
until the cattle were confiscated, did any of the parties
hereto or any other person attempt: to secure a brand
- 5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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inspection on the cattle, and when the Defendant-Respondent
WALTER STEWART attempted to remove the cattle from Mills,
it was his intention to transport the cattle from Juab
County to

Utah County, or from one branding district to

another.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THE
PLAINTIFF TO BE THE SOLE OWNER OF THE CATTLE
AND THAT NO LEGAL BASIS EXISTED UPON WHICH
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT STEWART COULD CLAIM
TITLE.
It is uncontroverted that the plaintiff, GARY J.
WITHERSPOON, was at the time of the alleged transaction,
and is still the owner of the Utah State Department of
Agriculture Certificate of Registration.

Title.4-13-11,

Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides:
"The certified copy of recordation thus
secured in the foregoing section shall be
prima facie evidence of the ownership of
such animal or animals by the party whose
brand and mark it might be and shall be
taken as evidence of ownership in all courts
of law or equity, or in any criminal proceedings when the title to the animal is
involved or property to be proved."
Witherspoon did not transfer his brand at any time,
and maintained the Certificate of Recordation in his
possession throughout the transaction and delivered the
original to the Court at the time of trial, which was marked
and recieved as an exhibit.
- 6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT
THE BILL OF SALE BETWEEN AMERICAN FEDERAL
CORPORATION AND THE DEFENDANT WALTER STEWART
FAILS TO COMPLY WITH THE EXPRESS REQUIREMENTS
OF 4-13-17 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
Title 4-13-17, UCA 1953, was designed specifically
to combat the problem of cattle rustling, or livestock theft.
The Act provides among other things that the certified copy
of the Brand Certificate is evidence of ownership, as
hereinbefore mentioned and said statute further provides
the precise manner in which brands or brand marks may be
transferred.
The Utah Livestock Brand and Anti-Theft Act,
(UCA 4-13-1, et sec.) further specifies with particularity
all requirements of a Bill of Sale for the transfer of
livestock.

4-13-17 states,

"Upon the sale, consignment, alienation or
transfer of title of any livestock, by any
person in this state, the actual delivery of
such animals shall be accompanied by a written
bill of sale from the vendor or the party
selling to the party purchasing giving the
number, sex, brands, and marks of each animal,
date and place of purchase, signature and
address of both seller and purchaser; provided,
that any person so selling or transferring title
to said livestock which are branded and marked
with any brand and mark not the recorded brand
and mark of person selling, shall provide proof
of ownership from whom the livestock was
purchased and the length of time held in his
possession."
The Bill of Sale between American Federal Corporation
and WALTER STEWART did not comply with the statute in the
following particulars:
1.

The Bill of Sale did not accompany actual
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben
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delivery of the animals.
2.

The Bill of Sale does not provide proof of

ownership marked by a brand not that of the vendor.
3.

The Bill of Sale does not record the length

of time the vendor held the cattle in his possession.
4.

The Bill of Sale did not contain the

signatures and addresses of both the seller and the
purchaser.
The identical deficiencies occur in the Bill of
Sale between Deseret Distributing Corporation and American
Federal Corporation.

Therefore, each sale from the

Plaintiff-Respondent through the two corporations to
WALTER STEWART failed to comply with the Livestock Brand
and Anti-Theft Act, which was designed to protect the public
and prevent illegal sale of livestock.

The Act was

designed to protect the defendant Stewart from the very
problem now before the Court.
In Pugh vs. Stratton, 22 Utah 2d 190, 450 P.2d
463, 1969, the Utah Court held at page 466:
"Nevertheless, the mandate of the statute is
clear. A transfer of title is valid only if
effected in conformity with Section 4-13-17,
UCA 1953."
In Galeppi vs. C. Swanston & Son, 107 Cal. App. 30,
290 Pac. 116, 19 30, the California Court reached the same
conclusion.

In that case the plaintiff gave possession of

his cattle to one Charles King for a check for the purchase
- 8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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price.

The plaintiff refused to give a Bill of Sale until

the check was honored.
the cattle from King.

The defendants in the case bought
Plaintiff commenced an action for

conversion of the cattle against the defendants when the
check was dishonored.

King had left for parts unknown,

just as the unserved named defendants have in the present
case.

The California Court held that the sale was void

because where a statute is designed for the protection of
the public and prescribes a penalty, that penalty is
equivalent to an express prohibition and a contract in
violation of its provisions is void.
This is the identical situation in Utah.

UCA

4-13-66 provides,
"Any person who violates any provision
of this Act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
except as herein otherwise provided."
When WALTER STEWART entered into a contract for
the purchase of cattle, but did not conform to UCA 4-13-77,
he entered into a contract that was void in law and therefore received no title.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT
THE ALLEGED SALE FROM WHICH DEFENDANT STEWART
CLAIMS TITLE WAS VOID FOR FAILURE TO SECURE
A BRAND INSPECTION CERTIFICATE.
The Utah Livestock Brand and Anti-Theft Act, at
Section 4-13-77.5 specifically provides:
- 9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"All changes of ownership through private
sales or transactions, or at public auctions
or commission houses, shall be accompanied by
a brand inspection certificate."
In the present case, no brand inspection certificate accompanied either the sale between American Federal
Corporation and WALTER STEWART or the sale between Deseret
Distributing Corporation and American Federal Corporation
or Witherspoon and Yeck.

At the time of trial, defendant

Stewart acknowledged that the cattle were to be transferred
from one brand inspection district to another, in violation
of Title 4-13-28, UCA, which provides,
"It shall be unlawful for any person to
transport by truck any livestock originating
at any point within a district to a point
beyond the boundaries of said district until
the same shall have been duly inspected or
written authority given by the board or by
one of its authorized inspectors, to transport
subject to inspection at some station en route
as hereinafter required by this Act."
In Pugh vs. Stratton, the Court stated that the
sale was void where the statute was designed for the
protection of the public and prescribes a penalty, that
penalty is equivalent to an express prohibition, and the
contract in violation of its provisions is void.
POINT IV
THE CASE OF WILSON V. BURROWS RELIED UPON
BY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT DOES NOT APPLY TO
THE PRESENT CASE.
The case of Wilson v. Burrows, 27 Utah 2d 436,
497 P.2d 240 (1972) is readily distinguished from the
- 10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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present situation*
In Wilson, the contest is between a conditional
vendor of real property and a bank as a subsequent secured
party.

The vendors sold real estate, cattle, and other

items under a uniform real estate contract.

The vendee

then pledged the cattle described under the contract to a
bank as collateral for a loan, as specifically allowed by
the real estate contract.

The bank perfected its security

interest in accordance with UCA 70A-9-302. The vendors of
the property some months later also perfected.

The question

before the court was which party had the prior security
interest in the cattle.
On the basis of the provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code as adopted in UCA 70A, the court ruled for
the bank.

The vendor tried to assert the provisions of

the Utah Livestock Brand and Anti-Theft Act, Section 4-13-1,
et seq., UCA 1953.
The court held its provisions did not apply to
this situation concluding that, "In any event, the [vendors]
cannot now claim that their contracts entered into with
[the vendee] were not made in good faith."
The differences between Wilson and the present
case are vital and extreme.

In Wilson, the vendor specific-

ally provided for the cattle to be released to the vendee
for the purpose of allowing a third party to acquire a
- 11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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secured interest.

In the present case the vendor promised

to release the cattle only on fulfillment of a condition
precedent namely to pay the full purchase price.
In Wilson, the vendor had to assert his own bad
faith in order to void the sale.

In the present case all

that is asserted is the bad faith of the PlaintiffRespondent's vendee.
In Wilson, the cattle form part of the financing
arrangement of real property.

In the present case the

cattle are the sole subject of sale.
In Wilson, to allow the vendor to make the contract
and then assert its voidness because of the vendor's
personal neglect in filing a security agreement would offend
justice.

In the present case the Plaintiff-Respondent is

claiming the protection of a law designed to cover and
protect both himself and the Defendant-Appellant.
A crucial difference between Wilson and the present
case is that had the vendor in Wilson complied fully with
the Act the result reached by the Court would have been the
same because the result was determined by the Uniform
Commercial Code.

Had the Defendant-Appellant, Stewart,

complied with the Act he would have discovered that the
people he purchased from did not have good title.
CONCLUSION
The unserved named defendants are clearly the
most blame worthy in this case.

If the police could find

by thebe
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The present case presents the problem of choosing between
two innocent parties.

The primary question is, who was in

the better position to discover the fraud of the unserved
defendants.
Plaintiff-Respondent, Witherspoon, did all he
could to prevent taking of the cattle as soon as he
realized the checks had been dishonored.

He recovered

possession of the contract and Bill of Sale given to Yeck.
He informed Yeck, the sheriff and the bank that the cattle
were not to be moved.

He did all that he reasonably could

to prevent transfer of the cattle.
Defendant-Appellant Stewart could have discovered
the fraud of the other defendants had he complied with the
statute.

If he had secured a proper Bill of Sale he would

have known that Yeck and the others never had possession or
title to the cattle.

He was told by Seth McPherson at the

time he seized the cattle that Witherspoon was asserting
title.
If Stewart had secured a brand inspection as
required by statute, he would have known that title still
rested in Witherspoon and not in any of the parties with
whom he dealt.

Clearly Defendant-Appellant Stewart was

under obligation to comply with the statutes designed to
protect him from just this type of happening.
Plaintiff-Respondent, GARY J. WITHERSPOON, is
therefore entitled to have the judgment of the lower court
affirmed.
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Respectfully submitted this

day of March,

1976.

RICHARD RICHARDS
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
2506 Madison Avenue
Ogden, Utah
84401

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent to Walter T. Stewart,
pro se, RFD #2, Box 199, Spanish Fork, Utah
/$

84660, this

day of March, 1976.
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